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Reshaping the WTO
by Jagdish Bhagwati
Mr. Bhagwati, University Professor at Columbia University and senior
fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is the author of In Defense of
Globalization (Oxford, 2004). He has been economic policy adviser to the GATT,
external adviser to the WTO and special adviser on globalization to the United
Nations.
On January 17, the director general of the World Trade Organization Dr.
Supachai Panitchpakdi released a report by a small expert group consisting of eight
members, of which I was one. Dr. Supachai had commissioned the group in June
2003 to offer an analysis of the WTO’s working in the past and to offer a blueprint
of where we ought to take the institution in the future.
The timing of the report could not be more appropriate. First because 2005
marks the 10  anniversary of the WTO. More importantly, the Doha Round ofth
multilateral trade negotiations is at a critical juncture. Several of the contentious
issues are intimately related to the scope and functioning of the WTO, and also to
the proposition that the freeing of trade makes sense for all members of the WTO.
In addition, when Dr. Supachai’s successor takes up the reins in September, he will
need all the guidance he can get if he is to provide the leadership that the institution
and the world trading system clearly require. 
With critiques and controversies plaguing the WTO from Seattle to Cancun,
it has become necessary to separate the intellectual wheat from the chaff. The chaff
mostly relates to the mistaken rejections of the advantages of freer trade; the wheat
to the constructive concerns about the WTO’s functioning.
The Chaff: Freer Trade under Fire
Sadly, the critics who are most off the mark, and indeed off the wall, are to
be found among the well-meaning non-governmental organizations. Enormously
rich charities have now turned to agitating about trade issues with much energy but
little understanding. When Oxfam agitators at the WTO meeting in Cancun in 2002
paraded about wearing the masks of G-8 leaders, this prompted the witticism that
here were a bunch of dummies masquerading as other dummies.
Oxfam’s annual spending is over $350 million; that of Action Aid is nearly
$140 million. These and others are now very big businesses, and like corporations
they are under pressure to diversify into new areas of public policy in search of
growth, regardless of expertise, as they pursue fundraising opportunities. But they
are more dangerous when they speak from incompetence, since they wear halos
that the corporations do not.
These charities have signed on to several fallacies that imperil the poor
countries whose interests they claim to represent. Some are easily dismissed. For
instance, they argue that free trade is not sufficient for growth; we also need other
supportive policies. By and large, yes; and every serious scholar of trade has
understood this from as long ago as the 1960s when the trade policies of the
developing countries were being studied. But then again, it does not follow that
freeing trade is no better than not freeing it. But consider next some of the less
shallow, but no less pernicious, fallacies:
Poor countries suffer from systematic rich-country “hypocrisy” leading to
“double standards” in trade policy, with the rich countries having more trade
barriers than the poor ones. 
The truth is exactly the opposite: There is greater tariff protection on
manufactures in the poor countries. This has followed from the fact that the poor
countries, not the rich ones, have long been given Special & Differential Treatment
in trade negotiations. They are also overtaking the rich countries in the number of
anti-dumping filings. Moreover, few poor countries have undertaken significant
commitments on services. The developing countries also are free not to sign the
optional procurement code which all rich nations have signed.
What should we make of the fact that the rich-country tariffs are lower for
rich-country exports of manufactures than for poor-country exports? Is that not
hypocrisy? Not really. It is a simple consequence of the fact that the poor countries
have conventionally been exempted from making tariff concessions to get tariff
concessions. Rich countries then typically avoid making significant concessions on
products of interest to the poor countries. If you want a free lunch, do not expect to
eat at a banquet!
While trade liberalization by rich countries is beneficial, for the poor
countries trade liberalization does not bring benefits. 
In this fallacy, the charities are supported by a handful of economists who
are repeatedly invoked against a mass of empirical evidence and a preponderance
of trade experts. One may cynically remark that the market incentive to be in the
dissenting group is greater—the fewer their number, the higher their scarcity value. 
The protection of infant industries against imports much too often tends to
be indiscriminate and creates strong incentives for the infant producers to remain
inefficient and to continue demanding protection which then becomes politically
difficult to remove. The result is that the infant does not learn and grows up
wearing protectionist diapers into premature senility. 
Besides, the notion that the poor countries need infant-industry protection to
industrialize has always been indulged to excess whereas experience shows
otherwise. India managed with its own native entrepreneurs to develop industries
such as textiles, shipping and steel under British rule, without protection and even
despite British hostility. There are other examples of growth without protection, at
least of a sustained variety. Fear, not experience, is at the heart of protectionism
here. 
Moreover, postwar trade analyses show, and what the charities do not
understand, is that autarkic trade barriers create a bias against exports. Therefore,
even when the rich-country markets are opened further, one’s own trade barriers
can prevent the penetration of these markets. To use a helpful analogy, even if the
rich-country door is opened, the poor-country exporters may find that the poor-
country door is closed and they cannot get out to get past the rich-country’s open
door. Studies of African trade policy by economists such as Alexander Yeats have
underlined this important lesson which emerged from in-depth empirical studies of
several developing countries’ trade policies during the 1960s and ’70s. 
Agricultural subsidies in the rich countries are keeping the developing world
poor. 
The removal of subsidies is desirable, as it promises aggregate income gains,
and many economists have therefore campaigned against them for nearly four
decades. But Oxfam and the heads of several international aid institutions have
now added the twist that the removal of these subsidies will also help the poorest
countries known as the “least developed countries.” This is dangerous nonsense. 
The economists Alberto Vales and Alex McCalla have shown that as many
as 45 LDCs, out of 49, are net food importers; and as many as 33 are net importers
of all agricultural products together. As prices rise with the removal of subsidies,
surely the importers will be harmed, not helped, except in the singular cases where
the importers switch to becoming significant exporters. The mistake on the part of
Oxfam, the leadership at the World Bank and countless journalists who have
followed in their wake is easily understandable but not to be condoned: They have
simply assumed that what is true of cotton subsidies in the rich countries, because
there are four African countries that rely on cotton exports, must be true more
generally. This is the fallacy of using an unrepresentative sample!
Moreover, it is easy to see that the Cairns group of middle-income, large
agricultural exporters such as Argentina and New Zealand, long frustrated by the
inability to get rich-country agriculture liberalized, have found it politically
convenient to pretend that agricultural protection in the rich countries harms the
poor nations of Africa. 
Are the rich-country subsidies to be put down to hypocrisy? A major reason
for their survival despite economists’ complaints is simply that many poor
countries themselves for decades were not interested in agricultural development.
They identified development with industrialization; and their own trade policies
created a substantial bias against agricultural development. Thus, rich countries
wanted to protect their agriculture; the poor countries wanted to decimate theirs. A
Faustian bargain resulted. Hypocrisy is hardly the way to characterize it.
The Wheat: The World’s Trading System
But if many criticisms of freer trade in the public domain today should be
dismissed, as the WTO report argues, there are also some serious threats to the
WTO’s well-being. The threats come from two directions: the escalating erosion of
non-discrimination and the steady encroachment by rich-country lobbies seeking to
impose their unrelated agendas on trade agreements. Institutional reform requires
two main changes: relaxing the “tightness” of obligations that the WTO now
incorporates and creates political waves, and augmenting its minuscule resources.
The Erosion of Non-Discrimination 
Non-discrimination was at the heart of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) that merged into the WTO in 1995. The most-favored nation
clause ensured that every GATT member faced the lowest tariffs that any other
member enjoyed. The few exceptions were explicit—for instance, Article 24
exempted countries entering into Preferential Trade Agreements such as a Free
Trade Agreement or a Customs Union from having to extend their tariff cuts
automatically to non-member countries. 
But today, the central principle of non-discrimination has been virtually
destroyed. Thus, PTAs have proliferated to close to 300 and the number is growing
by the week. The agreements which the architects of the GATT thought would be
minor exceptions have now swallowed up the trading system.
All economists now recognize the resulting “spaghetti bowl” problem, as I
have christened it. The world trading system is characterized by a chaotic criss-
crossing of preferences, with a plethora of different trade barriers applying to
products depending on which countries they originate from. This is a fool’s way of
doing trade—not only does it destroy the efficient allocation of resources, but it
flies in the face of the fact that today it is becoming almost impossible to define
which product is whose. It is hard to believe that sensible men in charge of trade
policy today, including the USTR, the EU Trade Commissioner and other
luminaries of trade are so unmindful of the fact that, in the name of free trade, they
are damaging the world trading system through discriminatory PTAs as much as
the protectionists did in the 1930s.
At the same time, non-discrimination has been undermined by
discrimination in favor of developing countries in diverse ways. They enjoy
preferential access to rich-country markets under the Generalized Scheme of
Preferences (GSP), giving them market access at lower-than-MFN tariff rates.
Moreover, they are allowed to reduce without any restrictions whatsoever trade
barriers by any percentage and for any products preferentially among themselves
under the Enabling Clause. This “Special & Differential” treatment sounds
desirable; but its undermining of non-discrimination in the world trading system
has serious downsides from the viewpoint of the developing countries as well.
The grant of one-way preferences to the developing countries under the GSP
schemes turns out, on examination, to be full of holes. The product eligibility is
limited, the preferences terminate when exports are successful, and reverse
preferences for the rich countries are almost always built into these schemes. Both
the EU and the U.S. have also used these schemes to extract not just preferential
trade concessions (such as provisions favoring the import of the rich country’s
intermediates) but also, as discussed below, a number of unrelated concessions.
The EU has taken matters further by cynically differentiating, in pursuit of political
agendas, among different developing countries in the grant of preferences.
That the Enabling Clause permits two or more developing countries to
reduce any trade barrier among themselves, regardless of restrictions such as in
Article 24 which requires chiefly the restrictions that the preferential tariff
reductions for members of a PTA must be on “substantially” all products and that
there must be a commitment to reaching full 100% reduction by a target date, is
also an option that poses real harm to the developing countries by cluttering up
their trade regime with a mass of inefficiencies. It is usually defended by its
proponents on the ground that these countries need “policy space.” But this is like
saying that the ability to shoot oneself in the foot gives one policy space. 
Therefore, between the proliferation of PTAs and the spread of S&D, the
centrality of non-discrimination has virtually vanished. Consider that the EU’s
MFN tariffs now apply only to five countries, with all others enjoying politically
driven lower-tariff access to the EU under multiple PTAs, differentiated GSP
(Generalized Scheme of Preferences) , EBA (Everything But Arms) and other
schemes. Evidently, the MFN tariff in the EU has now become the LFN, the least
favored nation, tariff!
It is too late to put the genie back in the bottle. So the report concludes,
along with many thoughtful observers, that the only way to kill the PTA-generated
preferences, which are of course relative to the MFN tariff, is to bring the MFN
tariff itself down to negligible levels. In short, conclude the Doha Round and go on
to another multilateral trade negotiation until we get the MFN tariffs virtually
down to zero—a U.S. aspiration, as it happens.
Yet another threat to the multilateral trading system arises from the ability of
rich-country lobbies to capture, through use of PTAs and the design of S&D
preference schemes, the trade liberalization process to advance their unrelated
agendas. These lobbies pretend, of course, that “fair trade” and respect for
“collective preferences”—both self-serving phrases that conceal the pernicious
nature of the demands—require that their pet concerns such as labor standards be
worked into trade agreements and institutions such as the WTO. 
This has united the major developing countries such as India and Brazil,
both led by democratically elected progressive leaders, against the inclusion of
such extraneous issues into trade negotiations and institutions. The Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) has also been held up by Brazil, which insists
correctly on confining it to trade liberalization, while the United States wishes to
corrupt the FTAA with several extraneous issues. Revealingly, none of the many
PTAs among the poor countries ever include these extraneous issues—their
inclusion arises only when the U.S. and the EU are members.
Variable Geometry 
Can this matter be resolved by introducing institutional change at the WTO,
by admitting what the report calls “variable geometry”? Could we simply say that
if the EU, U.S. and Norway want to include labor standards into the WTO, why not
just let them do it and let the agreement apply only to themselves. This, however,
will not do. 
True, if member states agree that an issue is a WTO issue, then some nations
could take on additional obligations and rights. But the issue here is that the major
developing countries with a modicum of power to resist the political play of the
rich countries object to having the trade-unrelated issues in the WTO in the first
place. Surely they would see through this variable geometry as a ploy to get the
objectionable issues into the WTO, a foot-in-the-door strategy. The same applies to
the sneaky way in which the EU, according to an EC document on its recent trade
policy record, seems to have managed to get these issues into its Trade Policy
Review Mechanism reports at the WTO while no one was looking.
These and other issues require that the proponents of free trade carefully
examine the next WTO director general’s views on them. It also requires that, as he
steers the WTO over waters agitated by them, he has access to a world-class and
substantial secretariat of his own. The WTO’s current annual budget is less than
$100 million—and no, I did not forget a zero.
As a result, the WTO essentially has to rely for trade analysis on the “foreign
legions” at the World Bank, the OECD etc. At Seattle, Cancun, Doha and other
WTO meetings, the world’s media typically focus not on the WTO’s analyses and
economists, but on those from these other institutions. This is a travesty. It needs to
be put right.
